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Richard Bradley1
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Abstract How should we revise our beliefs in response to the expressed probabilistic
opinions of experts on some proposition when these experts are in disagreement? In
this paper I examine the suggestion that in such circumstances we should adopt a linear
average of the experts’ opinions and consider whether such a belief revision policy is
compatible with Bayesian conditionalisation. By looking at situations in which full or
partial deference to the expressed opinions of others is required by Bayesianism I show
that only in trivial circumstances are the requirements imposed by linear averaging
compatible with it.
Keywords Linear averaging · Bayesian conditionalisation · Expert testimony ·
Deference
1 Introduction
When others have information or judgemental capabilities that we lack, then their
opinions are a resource that we can and should exploit for the purposes of forming or
revising our own opinions. But how should we do this? In this paper I will compare two
types of answer to this question—Bayesian conditioning and opinion pooling—and
ask whether they are compatible. Some interesting work on the question suggests a
positive answer under various conditions, see for instance the studies by Genest and
Schervish (1985), Bonnay and Cozic (submitted) and Romeijn and Roy (submitted).
But the question remains of how restrictive these conditions are.
B Richard Bradley
r.bradley@lse.ac.uk
1 Department of Philosophy, Logic and Scientific Method, London School of Economics,
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, UK
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A Bayesian treats the expressed opinions of others as evidence for and against the
truth of the claim under consideration, evidence whose relevance is captured by an
assignment of a conditional probability for the claim, given each possible combination
of others’ opinions. She responds to this evidence by conditioning on it, i.e. by adopting
as her revised opinion her conditional degrees of belief given the expressed opinions.
The opinion pooler, on the other hand, adopts as her new opinion an aggregate of the
expressed opinions of others (and perhaps her own), an aggregate that in some way
reflects the epistemic value that she attaches to each of the expressed opinions.
I shall assume here that Bayesianism provides the gold standard for coherent revi-
sion of belief in the kinds of situation in which it applies, namely when we have prior
probabilities for not only the hypotheses of ultimate interest but also for all possible
combinations of evidence (in this case, the expressions of opinion) that either confirm
or disconfirm these hypotheses, and when everything that we learn is representable
by one such possible combination. The problem is that it is not always easy to apply
the Bayesian theory. In circumstances in which the evidence takes a ‘non-standard’
form, such as when it is imprecise or conditional in form, we can turn to other forms of
belief revision, such as Jeffrey conditioning or Adams conditioning.1 But when we are
unable to assign prior probabilities to the possible evidence propositions, or determine
associated likelihoods, then no conditioning method at all may be applicable. This can
happen because there are simply too many possibilities for us to process them all, or
because we do not have enough information to assign a precise probability with any
confidence.
These difficulties are acutely pertinent to the question of how to exploit the infor-
mation taking the form of expert opinion reports. Consider, for instance, someone
who claims to be an expert on wines. What is the probability that they will make any
particular judgement about any particular wine? If you do not know much about wine,
it will be hard to say. In the statistics literature, agents who change their beliefs by
conditionalising on the testimonial evidence of experts are known as supra-Bayesians
[see, for instance, Morris (1974) and French (1981)]. Supra-Bayesians must have pri-
ors over the opinion states of all those whose opinions count as evidence for them
with regard to some proposition. But opinions about opinions might be evidence too,
and opinions about opinions about opinions. And so on. It would be fair to say that
supra-Bayesians are required to be cognitive super-Humans.
A Bayesian with more limited cognitive resources has two reasons for taking an
interest in opinion pooling. First, it might help her in thinking about how to assign
the probabilities to the hypotheses, conditional on combinations of opinion, that she
needs to revise her own opinions by conditionalisation when she gets information of
this kind. Second, in circumstances in which she cannot conditionalise on expressions
of opinion because she lacks the requisite conditional probabilities for the hypotheses
that interest her, she might adopt opinion pooling as an alternative method of belief
revision. In both cases, the diligent Bayesian will want to know whether a particular
rule for opinion pooling is compatible with her commitment to conditionalisation.
This is true not just when she uses opinion pooling as a guide to making conditional
1 See Bradley (2007) for a discussion.
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probability judgements, but also in the case when she uses it as an alternative to
conditionalisation. For in this latter case, she will want to know that there is some
way of assigning prior probabilities to combinations of expressed opinion and to the
hypotheses that are evidentially dependent on them, such that the pooled opinion
is what she would have obtained by conditionalisation if these had been her prior
probabilities.
In this paper I will address the question of whether revision of belief in response
to testimonial evidence by application of a well-known form of opinion pooling—
linear averaging—is compatible with Bayesian norms of belief change together with
some minimal conditions on appropriate respect for expert judgement. I will begin
by defining this form of opinion pooling and making more precise what is required
for it to be compatible with Bayesian revision. In subsequent sections, I investigate
what Bayesianism requires of agents in some rather simple situations; in particular,
ones which mandate deference to the opinions of one or more experts on some specific
proposition. Finally I consider the consistency of these requirements with those implied
by linear averaging, drawing particularly on Dawid et al. (1995). The conclusion is
somewhat surprising. Linear averaging, even when applied to a single proposition, is
not (non-trivially) compatible with Bayesian conditionalisation in situations involving
more than one source of expert testimony to which deference is mandated.
2 Linear averaging and Bayes compatibility
When an agent revises her opinions by linear averaging she responds to the reported
opinions of others by adopting a new opinion that is a weighted average of the reported
opinions and her own initial one. When these weights are allowed to vary with the
proposition under consideration, such a revision rule will be said to exhibit propo-
sition dependence. More precisely, an agent with probabilistic degrees of belief P
on a Boolean algebra of propositions revises her opinions on some subset Ω of it
by proposition-dependent linear averaging in response to the testimonial evidence
of n others just in case, for any proposition X ∈ Ω and profile x1, ..., xn of reported
probabilistic opinions on X , she adopts new probabilistic degrees of belief Q such that
Q(X) =
(∑n
















i ≤ 1, canonically interpreted
as measures of the (relative) judgemental competence of individuals. Note that these
weights (potentially) depend on X but not on what the others report on X .
There is a large statistics literature, and a modest philosophical one, on proposition-
independent linear averaging and its properties, in which the weights are taken to be
constant across propositions, see Genest and Zidek (1986) and Dietrich and List (2016)
for good surveys.2 Much of this literature is focused on the problem of how a group
2 Because this literature largely considers aggregation only on full Boolean algebras, proposition-dependent
weights are ruled out by the requirement that aggregate opinions be probabilities. See Dietrich and List
(2017) for a more general discussion.
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should form a consensual opinion on some issue, a question that is not directly related
to that of how individuals should improve their own opinions by taking into account the
information provided by the opinions of others. These two issues can come together, as
they do in the theory of Lehrer and Wagner (1981) and Wagner (1982), if the way that
the consensus is achieved is by individuals revising their beliefs rationally in response
to the expressed opinions of others. But here we only concerned with the question of
whether revising one’s beliefs in this way is epistemically rational.
This is important because, whether or not proposition-independent linear averaging
has merit as a means of forming a consensual or group probability from a diverse set
of individual ones, it is seriously flawed as a method of belief revision where epis-
temic considerations are paramount [contrary to Lehrer’s (1976) claim that rationality
requires that we revise our beliefs in this way]. This is so for two important rea-
sons. First, linear averaging is not sensitive to the proposition-specific competencies
of individuals. But intuitively individuals have different domains of expertise: I do not
take my plumber’s pronouncements about health risks very seriously, for instance, but
equally I would not get my doctor to tell me the cause of the drainage problems in my
house. Second, proposition-independent linear averaging is insensitive to whether the
opinions expressed by different individuals on the same proposition are independent
or not. But the evidential significance of individuals’ reported probability for some
proposition is quite different when their judgements are arrived at independently than,
say, when they are based on exactly the same information.
Neither of these problems affect the proposition-dependent version of linear aver-
aging under consideration here, which leaves the learning agent free to assign weights
to others which are sensitive to their competence on the specific proposition in ques-
tion and any probabilistic dependencies between their reports (though not to tailor the
weights to what they report). Likewise although it is well known that proposition-
independent linear averaging is not generally consistent with Bayesian norms of
revision [see for instance Bradley (2006)], the question of whether proposition-
independent averaging is so remains open. To explore it, I will work within a rather
restricted setting. Our protagonist will be an agent (You) who learns the opinions of
n truthful experts on some particular contingent proposition X and who revises her
own opinions on X in the light of this testimonial evidence. You and the n experts
are assumed to be Bayesian reasoners in the sense of having probabilistic degrees of
belief for all propositions of interest, which are revised by conditionalising on any evi-
dence that is acquired. To keep things simple, I shall assume that all have probabilistic
beliefs regarding the elements of a background Boolean algebra of propositions S that
is sufficiently rich as to contain all propositions of interest: including not only X itself,
but propositions expressing evidence relevant to X and, in particular, the reports of
the experts on it.
Let Pr be a (given) prior probability measure on S measuring the initial degrees
of belief regarding its elements of an agent (You). Let E be your total evidence at
the time when You receive the experts’ reports on X and let P(·) := Pr(·|E). So
P is a constant in what follows. To avoid problems with zero probabilities when
conditionalising, I assume that Pr is regular, i.e. that it assigns non-zero probability
to all contingent propositions in S. I shall say that an event (or a value of a random
variable or a combination of values of random variables) is “possible” when it is
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compatible with the background information E , so that in some world both the event
(or value or combination of values) and E obtain. Given the regularity assumption
on Pr, it follows that anything that is possible has positive probability given E : in
particular, any possible expert report, any possible profile of expert reports, and any
possible expert posterior (this allows us to meaningfully conditionalise on them).
Let Ri (X) be a random variable ranging over the possible probabilistic opinions
on X that expert i will report. Note that the regularity assumption implies that only
countably many expert reports are possible (otherwise, there would exist uncountably
many mutually exclusive events of positive probability). Now revising your beliefs by
linearly averaging reported opinions on X is compatible with Bayesian conditionali-
sation, given P , only if it satisfies the following constraint:3
(LAC) There exist non-negative weights α0, α1, . . . , αn such that
∑n
i=0 αi = 1 and
such that for any possible profile, x1, ..., xn , of reported probabilistic opinions
on X :
P(X |R1(X) = x1, ...,Rn(X) = xn) =
(∑n
i=1 αi · xi
)
+ α0 · P(X)
We now want to know what restrictions LAC places on P—in particular, on your
conditional probabilities for X given the experts’ reports—with an eye to establishing
whether these restrictions are consistent with reasonable responses to expert opinion. I
will tackle the issue in the reverse direction, showing in the next section what Bayesian-
ism requires us to do in response to the experts’ reports of their probabilistic opinions
before testing, in subsequent sections, for the compatibility of these requirements with
LAC.
3 Deference to experts
As many authors have observed, we might defer to someone’s opinion because we
think that they hold information that we do not or because we believe them to have
skills which make them better at judging the significance of the information that we
both hold (see for instance, Joyce 2007; Elgar 2007). To investigate the former cases
in isolation from the latter, let us assume that the experts share with You prior Pr over
the background domain S. In this case, because You and the experts are Bayesian
reasoners, the posterior beliefs of the experts are just the beliefs that You would have
adopted had You acquired the same evidence as them. Furthermore, any situation in
which (You know that) they have acquired at least as much evidence as You, You
should be disposed to adopt whatever degrees of belief they have acquired on the basis
of this evidence. In short, Bayesianism requires that You should defer to the opinions
of any of the experts who acquire more information than You.
To establish this claim more formally, let Ei be a (proposition-valued) random vari-
able ranging over the possible total evidences of expert i and let Ri be a random
3 I make no claim for LAC being a sufficient condition for Bayes compatibility, only that it is necessary.
Presumably consistency across a sequence of revisions would also be required for instance.
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variable ranging over i’s possible posterior probabilistic belief states on S after con-
ditionalisation on their total information. Note that Ri (·) = Pr(·|Ei ) and that, for
all possible belief states of expert i , Ri = Ri is equivalent to Ei = Ei , with Ei
being the logically strongest proposition in S to which Ri assigns probability one.
Now circumstances in which the expert holds (weakly) more information than You
are ones in which their total evidence Ei implies your evidence E . Given the common
prior assumption, these are just the circumstances in which Ri (E) = 1. So it is a
consequence of the assumption that You and the experts are Bayesian agents that:
Information Deference For all of expert i’s possible belief states Ri on S, if Ri (E) = 1
(i.e. if expert i has no less information than You), then:
P(·|Ri = Ri ) = Ri (·)
Proof Let Ei be the support of Ri . Then P(·|Ri = Ri ) = P(·|Ei = Ei ) = Pr(·|Ei =
Ei , E). Now E is implied by Ei which in turn is equivalent to Ei = Ei since in the
event of the expert learning any proposition they also learn that they learn it. It follows
that Pr(·|Ei = Ei , E) = Pr(·|Ei ) = Ri (·). unionsq
As an aside, note that when You regard your future opinions as a source of expertise
because based on more information then Information Deference implies Van
Fraassen’s (1984) well-known Reflection Principle. For let P0 = Pr(·|E) be your
current degrees of belief and Pt be a random variable ranging over your possible pos-
terior probabilistic belief states on S at future time t obtained by conditionalisation
on any additional information that You have acquired by that time. Then, as You will
be better informed at t than You are now, Information Deference requires that your
conditional degrees of belief should satisfy P0(·|Pt = Pt ) = Pt (·).
3.1 Revising by deferring
It follows immediately from Information Deference that in situations in which You
know that expert i has obtained more information than You, your degrees of belief
should equal the expected posterior probabilities of expert i , conditional on their
information Ei , i.e. that whenever P(Ri (E) = 1) = 1:4
P = E(Ri ) (2)
It follows that You expect the expert to believe what You currently do; justifiably so,
because what You believe is based on all the evidence that You have at that time. Or to
put it the other way round, if You believed the expert to hold evidence regarding the
truth of some proposition that makes it more probable than You judge it to be, then
You should immediately adjust your belief in that proposition. Evidence of evidence
for a proposition is evidence for that proposition.
4 See [Joyce (2007), p. 191] for a generalisation of this claim.
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Testimony from experts provides precisely this kind of evidence of evidence and
hence should induce revision of your opinions. In particular, when a single expert’s
testimony regarding some proposition X is the only information that You acquire,
then You should be disposed to adopt whatever opinion the expert reports on it. For in
virtue of the expert’s truthfulness, what she reports is her posterior degree of belief in
X which, in virtue of the assumption of a common prior, is just your probability for
X given the evidence obtained by her.
More formally, let Ri (as before) be a random variable ranging over the possible
posterior probabilistic belief states on S of expert i after they have conditionalised
on their total information and let Q be a random variable representing your possible
probabilistic belief states after hearing expert i’s reported opinion on X . Suppose that
P(Ri (E) = 1) = 1 and that the expert reports a probability of x for X . Then as a
Bayesian agent You must revise your degrees of belief in accordance with:
Deference-based Revision If P(Ri (E) = 1) = 1 then:
Q(X) = Ri (X)
Proof Bayesian conditionalisation requires that Q(X) = P(X |Ri (X)). By equation
2, P(X) = E(Ri (X)) and P(X |Ri (X)) = E(Ri (X)|Ri (X)) = Ri (X). So Q(X) =
Ri (X). unionsq
Two remarks. First, Deference-based revision requires that You adopt whatever
opinions on X that an expert reports in circumstances in which the expert holds strictly
more information. Revision of this kind is consistent with linear averaging if and only
if full weight is given to the expert’s opinion. For in the envisaged circumstances your
revised probabilities, Q, after hearing expert i’s report on X , are required to satisfy,
for 0 ≤ αi ≤ 1, both:
Q(X) = Ri (X)
Q(X) = αiR(X) + (1 − αi )P(X)
and this implies that αi = 1 (or that they always report what you already believe). This
is, of course, just what one expects when the expert has strictly greater information
than You. So in situations in which full deference to a single expert is appropriate,
supra-Bayesian conditionalisation is (trivially) consistent with proposition-dependent
linear averaging.
Second, conformity to Deference-based Revision does not determine your entire
posterior belief state; just a fragment of it. To propagate the implications of deferring
to the expert’s reported opinion on X to the rest of one’s beliefs, one might reason-
ably follow Steele’s (2012) recommendation to Jeffrey conditionalise on the partition
{X,¬X} taking as inputs one’s newly revised degrees of belief for its elements. This
yields, for all propositions Y ∈ S:
Q(Y ) = P(Y |X) · Q(X) + P(Y |¬X) · Q(¬X) (3)
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Revising your beliefs in this fashion is demonstrably the rational thing to do just in case
You take the evidential significance for Y of the expert’s report on X to be screened
out by the truth of X or ¬X , i.e. just in case for any reported probability of x for X ,
P(Y |X,Ri (X) = x) = P(Y |X) and P(Y |¬X,Ri (X) = x) = P(Y |¬X). Then,
Q(Y ) = P(Y |Ri (X) = x)
= P(Y |X,Ri (X) = x) · P(X |Ri (X) = x)
+ P(Y |¬X,Ri (X) = x) · P(¬X |Ri (X) = x)
= P(Y |X) · Q(X) + P(Y |¬X) · Q(¬X)
Such screening out need not always occur, for there may be occasions on which
the expert’s report on a proposition is informative on more than the truth of just
that proposition, such as when the content of a report reveals something about the
conditions under which it is obtained. For instance, a report that the music is loud in
some location may reveal that the reporter has been there if there is no other way that
they could have learnt this. But screening-out is, I speculate, normally the case, for
we are usually interested in someone’s opinion on some proposition in virtue of the
information it provides about just that proposition.
A couple of cautionary points. First, it must be emphasised that revising one’s beliefs
by application of Deference-based Revision and Jeffrey conditionalisation does not
guarantee that one’s posterior beliefs will be the same as the expert’s, i.e. Q = Ri . (In
the absence of further information, however, one will expect them to be so.) Second,
one cannot mechanically apply this type of revision to a sequence of reports by the
expert. Suppose, for instance, having deferred to the expert’s opinion on X and then
Jeffrey conditioned on the partition {X,¬X}, the expert reports her opinion on Y . It
is clear that You should defer to this opinion as well, since the expert is still strictly
better informed than You. But if You attempt once again to revise your other beliefs
by Jeffrey conditioning, this time on the partition {Y,¬Y }, using your newly acquired
opinions on its members as inputs, You will be led to revise your opinion on X (except,
of course, when X and Y are probabilistically independent). And this would conflict
with your commitment to adopting the expert’s opinion on X as your own. What You
should do is revise your other beliefs subject to the dual constraint on the partition
{XY, X¬Y,¬XY,¬X¬Y } implied by your deference to the expert’s reported opinions
on both X and Y . However, this constraint does not determine a unique redistribution
of probability across the relevant partition. So we have not settled the question of how,
in general, one should respond to multiple reports by a single expert.
3.2 Different priors
Let us temporarily drop the assumption of common priors and look at cases in which
the expert has special skills rather than additional information. Suppose for example
that an investor has doubts about the financial viability of a company in which she holds
shares. The investor gets access to the company’s accounts but, lacking expertise in
accounting, has the books examined by an accountant. The accountant looks them over
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and declares a probability that the return on the investment will be at least as high as
required by the investor. Although the investor may completely trust the accountant’s
judgement of the evidence provided by the company’s accounts, she may nonetheless
not be willing simply to adopt the accountant’s posterior probabilistic judgement on
the returns to an investment, because she suspects that the accountant’s prior is less
reasonable than her own.
In Bayesian statistics the support that some piece of evidence gives to one hypothesis
relative to another is often measured, in a prior-free way, by its Bayes factor.5 We arrive
at this factor in the following way. Note that for any probability P , propositions X and




P(E |Y ) ·
P(X)
P(Y )
So let the associated Bayes factor, B(E, X, Y ), on E , for X relative Y , be defined
by:
B(E, X, Y ) := P(E |X)
P(E |Y )
Then it follows that:
P(X |E)




Now in situations in which one wishes to defer to an expert’s judgement on the
significance of some evidence E , but not to their prior opinions, one can use the
decomposition given by Eq. 4 to determine one’s posterior probabilities from the
expert’s Bayes factors and one’s own prior opinion. To illustrate, as before let your
and the expert’s prior and posterior probabilities following receipt of E , respectively,
be Pr and Pri and P and Ri . Suppose that the expert reports both Pri (X) and Ri (X).
From this their Bayes factor on E for X relative to ¬X can be determined by:
B(E, X,¬X) = Pri (E |X)
Pri (E |¬X)
= Pri (X |E)




1 − Ri (X) .
1 − Pri (X)
Pri (X)
Let BEX be the Bayes factors on E for X relative to its negation that is implicitly
reported by the expert. Then if You defer to the expert’s judgement (only) on the
significance of the evidence E for X in the sense of being disposed to adopt whatever
Bayes factor that they report, but also to retain your own prior probabilistic judgement
on X , then your degrees of belief, Q, after hearing the expert’s report, should satisfy:









X · P(X) + P(¬X)
Rationale Since You are disposed to adopt the expert’s Bayes factor on E for X ,
but not their prior probability for X , on learning their Bayes factor you should set your
new conditional probabilities for X and ¬X , given E, in accordance with Eq. 4, i.e.
by:
Q(X |E)





But since You are a Bayesian agent and You know that E , Q(X |E) = Q(X) and
Q(¬X |E) = Q(¬X) = 1 − Q(X). Hence,
Q(X)





Bayes deference follows by rearrangement.
Two remarks. First, Bayes Deference, unlike Information Deference, is not implied
by Bayesianism. Indeed Q is not a Bayesian posterior in the usual sense because the
Bayes factors of the expert(s) are not assumed to be propositions in S. Instead Bayes
Deference expresses the implications for a Bayesian agent of adopting the relevant
Bayes factors of the expert(s) for some proposition but not their prior probability for
it. Second, revision of belief by application of Bayes Deference to a single proposition
does not determine the impact of the expert’s reports on your other degrees of belief.
But, with the same caveats as before, we may again combine it with Jeffrey condition-
alisation as in Eq. 3, taking as inputs the values Q(X) and Q(¬X), to propagate the
change to all other propositions.
4 Partial deference and Bayes compatibility
4.1 Single expert
As we have seen, Information Deference implies a disposition on the part of a Bayesian
agent to adopt whatever opinions on X that an expert reports, when that expert holds
strictly more information than her. Situations in which full deference is appropriate
are obviously quite special, however. Other situations call for only partial deference:
for instance when You and an expert hold different information relevant to X or
when different experts, although all holding strictly more information than You, hold
different information. In such cases, complete deferral to the opinion of the expert or
one of the experts would be tantamount to discarding some relevant information.
Let us consider the first of these cases and leave the second to the next sub-
section. Suppose that You and expert i have, respectively, acquired new information
E and Ei such that Pr(E, Ei ) > 0 and adopted posterior beliefs P = Pr(·|E) and
Ri (·) = Pr(·|Ei ). In these circumstances You should defer, not to the expert’s poste-
rior opinions, but to her posterior conditional opinions, given the information E that
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You have acquired; not to what she believes but to what she would believe were she
to hold all the information You do. For although Ri is not based on more information
than You hold, Ri (·|E) is. So the principle of deference to expertise based on greater
information implies:
Conditional Deference For all possible probability functions Ri on S:
P(·|Ri = Ri ) = Ri (·|E) (5)
Proof As before, let Ei be a random variable ranging over the possible total evidences
of expert i . Then P(·|Ri = Ri ) = P(·|Ei = Ei ) = Pr(·|Ei = Ei , E). But since Ei is
equivalent to Ei = Ei , it follows that Pr(·|Ei = Ei , E) = Pr(·|Ei , E) = Ri (·|E). unionsq
Conditional Deference expresses a general requirement on all Bayesian agents of
partial deference to expertise in circumstances of shared priors. Information Defer-
ence follows from it, expressing the special case in which the expert acquires no
less information than You (when Ei implies E and hence Ri (·|E) = R(·)). Note
that it also follows from Conditional Deference that your posterior degrees of belief
should equal the expected conditional degrees of belief of expert i given that E , i.e.
P = E(Ri |E). So it tells You to set your opinions to what You expect the expert
would believe were they to learn your information. This does not of course suffice to
determine how You should revise your beliefs in response to the expert’s report on X ,
since it is her conditional opinion on X given that E that You wish to adopt, not her
expressed unconditional opinion on X . So there is now an additional motive to ask
whether the kind of sensitivity to the expert’s opinion implied by linear averaging can
further constrain your opinion in a Bayes-compatible way. That is, we want to know
whether You can assign a weight α to the expert’s opinion on X , independent of what
she reports, such that for any reported opinion x in the range of Ri (X):
P(X |Ri (X) = x, E) = αx + (1 − α)P(X |E) = Ri (X |E)
Some simple examples suffice to reveal the obstacles to a positive response. Suppose
the expert reports a probability of zero for X . Now if Ri (X) = x = 0 then Ri (X |E) =
0 as well. So (1 − α)P(X |E) = 0 and hence either P(X |E) = 0 or α = 1, i.e. either
the expert reports what You already believe on the basis of your evidence or You defer
completely to their opinion. Similarly, if the expert reports a probability of one for X .
For if Ri (X) = 1 then Ri (X |E) = 1 as well. And so either P(X |E) = 1 or α = 0, i.e.
either the expert reports what You already believe on the basis of your evidence or You
attach no weight at all to their opinion. But complete deference to the expert’s opinion
is inappropriate in these circumstances because You hold information that she does
not.6 So we must conclude that linear averaging is Bayes compatible only if the expert
cannot learn the truth or falsity of X , unless You do too. In fact this conclusion extends
to cases in which the expert reports an intermediate probability for X . But instead of
showing this directly, I want to turn our attention to a case that is formally analogous
6 Indeed complete deference to the expert is inconsistent with the Reflection Principle, which requires P
to defer to P(·|E).
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to the one just discussed, namely in which two experts both hold more information
than You, and show that the corresponding claim holds in this case.
4.2 Multiple experts
Suppose that two experts, again sharing prior Pr with You have, respectively, acquired
new information E1 and E2 and adopted posterior beliefs R1 and R2, but that You
have acquired no information (hence P = Pr). In this case, in virtue of the shared
prior, Information Deference tells us that:
P(·|R1 = R1) = R1(·) = Pr(·|E1) (6)
P(·|R2 = R2) = R2(·) = Pr(·|E2) (7)
And from these two equations it follows that:
P(·|R1 = R1,R2 = R2) = Pr(·|E1, E2) (8)
Proof By 7, P(·|R1 = R1,R2 = R2) = Pr(·|R1 = R1, E2) = Pr(·|E1, E2) by 6.
unionsq
Since the experts’ reports do not allow You to infer what the propositions E1 and
E2 are that the experts have learnt, 8 is not enough to determine how You should
revise your beliefs in X . Nonetheless, we can now ask whether linear averaging (and
specifically LAC) is consistent with Eqs. 6, 7, and 8, i.e. whether there exists non-
negative weights α0, α1 and α2 such that α0 + α1 + α2 = 1 and such that for all
possible profiles of reported probabilistic opinions x1, x2 on X :
P(X |R1(X) = x1,R2(X) = x2) = α1x1 + α2x2 + α0 P(X) (9)
where, as indicated before, the αi can depend on X but not on what the experts report
about X .
The answer is that no such weights exist unless the experts always make the same
report. The reason for this is quite simple: without this restriction, Deference-based
Revision together with Eq. 9 requires that the weight You put on each expert’s report
does depend on what they report. To see this consider the following example. Suppose
that R2(X) = 0 but R1(X) = x1 > 0. Then by Information Deference P(X |R2(X) =
x2) = 0. It follows that:
P(X |R1(X) = x1,R2(X) = 0) = 0
So if You conditionalise on the experts’ reports on X then your posterior beliefs are
such that Q(X) = 0. But then by linear averaging:
Q(X) = α1R1(X) + α2R2(X) + α3 P(X)
= α1x1 + 0 + α3 P(X) = 0
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and this implies that α1 = 0 = α3. But by the same argument if R1(X) = 0 but
R2(X) = x2 > 0 then Bayes compatibility of proposition-dependent linear averaging
requires that α2 = 0 = α3 and hence that α1 = 1. So the weights on the experts’
reports on X are not independent of what they report.
We can put the point slightly differently. If the weights on the experts’ reports on
X are independent of what they report, then we can infer that they always make the
same report. In our example, we assumed that the experts made different reports to
infer weight variability. But if weights cannot vary then the experts cannot have made
different reports. So it cannot be possible for one expert to learn the truth or falsity of
X without the other doing so.
The conclusion holds more generally: so long as You put positive weight on both
experts’ opinions (which is mandatory, given that they hold more information than
You) then the requirement that averaging weights on expert opinion be independent
of what they report implies that they always make the same report, even when they
report intermediate probabilities for X . For Information Deference implies that You
expect, conditional on expert 1 reporting a probability of x for X , that your posterior
degree of belief in X , after hearing both experts’ reports, to be just x , i.e.
E(Q(X)|R1(X) = x) = x (10)
(This is proved as Theorem 1 in the “Appendix”). But Eq. 10, together with assump-
tion that your posterior beliefs are a linear average of the experts’, implies that your
conditional expectation for expert 2’s report on X , given that expert 1 reports a proba-
bility of x for X , equals x as well (Theorem 2 in the “Appendix”), and vice versa. By
Lemma 1 this can be the case only if the random variables corresponding to each of
the expert’s opinion reports are the same, i.e. if R1 = R2. So, on pain of contradic-
tion, your posterior opinion on X can be both a linear average of the expert’s reported
opinions and defer appropriately to these reports only if they always report the same
opinions.
4.3 Concluding remarks
We have shown that revising your beliefs on some proposition X by taking the linear
average of reported expert opinion on it is consistent with Bayesian conditioning only
in the trivial case when the experts always make the same report (with probability one).
This I take to rule linear averaging out as a rational response to disagreement in expert
opinion. It also, therefore, rules out linear averaging as a response to disagreement
with your epistemic peers, construed as others who share your priors but hold different
information. Or to disagreement between You and an expert when neither of you holds
strictly more information than the other. For these cases are formally analogous to that
of disagreement amongst experts with different information.
A couple of cautionary notes about the scope of these conclusions. First, nothing
has been said in this paper about other forms of averaging or indeed forms of opinion
pooling that do not involve averaging. Considerable guidance on this question can be
found in Dawid et al. (1995), where a much more extensive set of formal results on
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the Bayes compatibility of opinion pooling is proved. The upshot of these results is
far from settled, however, and the philosophical status of other pooling rules deserve
further exploration.
Second, it should also be emphasised that this study leaves open the question of
whether linear averaging is the appropriate response to situations in which you find
yourself in disagreement with peers who hold the same information as you and are
as a good at judging its significance. In the philosophical literature, the view that one
should respond to such disagreements by taking an equal-weighted average of your
opinions has been hotly debated. But nothing presented here militates either for or
against this view.
Appendix: Proofs
Lemma 1 For all bounded random variables Y and Z, if E(X |Y ) = Y and E(Y |X) =
X, then X = Y.
Proof Note that by the law of iterated expectations, E(Y ) = E(E(X |Y )) = E(X).
Now since (Y |X = x) = x , it follows by another application of the law of iterated
expectations that:
E(X · Y ) = E(E(XY |X))
= E(X · E(Y |X))
= E(X2)
It follows that:
cov(X, Y) = E[(X − E(X))(Y − E(Y )]
= E(X · Y ) − E(X) · E(Y )
= E(X2) − [E(X)]2
since E(X ·Y ) = E(X2) and E(Y ) = E(X). So cov(X, Y ) = var(X) = var(Y ). Hence,
var(X − Y ) = var(X) + var(Y ) − 2cov(X, Y ) = 0 . So X = Y with probability 1.
unionsq
Theorem 1 Suppose that P satisfies Information Deference with respect to R1 and
R2. Let χi be the range of Ri (X) and let Q over the possible posterior probabilities
obtained by conditionalising P on the reports of the experts. Then for any possible
value x¯1 of R1(X):
E(Q(X)|R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1
Proof By Information Deference, P(X |R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1; and
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P(X |R1(X) = x¯1) =
∑
x2∈χ2




P(X |R2(X) = x2,R1(X) = x¯1)) · P(R2(X)
= x2|R1(X) = x¯1)
= E[Q(X)|R1(X) = x¯1]
Hence, E(Q(X)|R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1. unionsq
Theorem 2 Suppose that prior P satisfies Information Deference with respect to R1
and R2 and that Q(X) = α1R1(X) + α2R2(X) + a0 P(X), where a0 = 1 − (α1 +
α2), 0 < α1, α2 and 0 ≤ α0. Then
E[R1(X)|R2(X) = x¯2] = x¯2
E[R2(X)|R1(X) = x¯1] = x¯1
Proof By Theorem 1, E(Q(X)|R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1. Hence,
E[α1R1(X) + α2R2(X) + a3 P(X)|R1(X) = x¯1] = x¯1
But by Information Deference, P(X |R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1. So by the Linearity property
of expectations:
α1E[R1(X)|R1(X) = x¯1] + α2E[R2(X)|R1(X) = x¯1] + α3 P(X |R1(X) = x¯1)
= α x¯1 + α2E(R2(X)|R1(X) = x¯1) + α3 x¯1
= x¯1
But this can be the case iff E(R2(X)|R1(X) = x¯1) = x¯1. By the same argument
E(R1(X)|R2(X) = x¯2) = x¯2. unionsq
Corollary 1 Under the assumptions of Theorem 2 and Lemma 1, R1 = R2
Proof Follows from Theorem 2 and Lemma 1. unionsq
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